Abstract

This paper presents an exploration of the writings of Abhas Chatterjee (1942-present), Sita Ram Goel (1921-2003), and Ram Swarup (1920-92) and tries to situate them within the framework of the extremist Hindutva movement. The authors would resist such a placement, as they frequently question and contest the definitions and limits of the movement set by the RSS, however, a closer inspection of their work reveals a common trait in each of these authors – which is a preoccupation with making Hindutva palatable for and with modernity, and this approach to making Hindutva compatible with modernity serves the objective of a distinct statehood oriented vision of Hindutva’s ideologues. The triumvirate takes an academic route to elaborate their views but also wishes to take one step further and settle theological questions posed to the movement from within its followers and from its external critiques. Taking a hermeneutical approach, this paper begins with tracing the foundational arguments the writers use to disseminate their ideology does not have any ‘authentic’ base in Hinduism. Still, it is a perspective developed on the arguments of several German Indologists, and thereby, as Ahmed (2023) famously argues, is a way of propagating a Hindu Orientalism of its own. 

Introduction

Inherent within Hindutva ideologues is the objective of seeking state power. Basu (2020) argues that Hindutva does not distinguish between religion, ideology and culture, as all of these have to  be consumed within the ‘way of life’ for the nation. Thereby the objective of these authors remains to justify Hindutva and Hinduism as a way of life that is equivalent to the promise that secular liberal democracy offers to modern nations. Common among the writings of right-wing Hindu thinkers, who belong roughly to the same time, are familiar tropes on Muslims and Christians that have been historically used to cast an image of the Other. If we were to trace the family tree of Hindu political thought, it would lead us back to the dawn of what we may call Enlightenment in India, wherein Indians first sought to create an indigenous idea of India in opposition to European civilisations.  to Goel and Chatterjee and Swarup, the RSS and its core ideologues, including Golwalker and Savarkar, did not evolve a comprehensive theological structure for Hindutva. They merely propagated a political vision; event, even though they talked about India as a holy land, it remained limited and did not offer a deistic perspective at all – and, therefore, can be called a secular take on political Hinduism. The Hindutva position on Muslims and Christians thereby did not move beyond declaring them as invaders and contrasting their foreignness to the land.

 However, what is interesting to note here is that Goel and Swarup attempt to draw a critique by criticising the fundamental tenets as well as the theology of Islam and Christianity. While the foreigner vs inside debate, along with claims that Hinduism is the most authentic religious system to the Indian subcontinent, continues, the works of these writers are unique in that they attempt to delegitimise Abrahamic faiths on the religious grounds themselves by declaring them false. 

Termed the ‘intellectual Kshatriya’, Goel has written extensively on topics concerning the Hindu right – namely, the question of minorities and of Hinduism in modern times. Crediting Ram Swarup for being the catalysis in drawing his commitment from Communism, anti-Communism, and consequently, Hinduism, Goel chronicles his return as a spiritual return but cites the urgent necessity of engaging with politics.

Sita Ram Goel, then a clerk in Calcutta, chanced upon a visit by a friend, Ram Swarup, which according to Pirbhai (2008), would prove to be a life-altering visit. According to Pirbhai (2008), both were born as Agarwals in British-ruled Punjab, the duo had several commonalities; they were both raised in an age where syncretic belief and intercommunal harmony was being challenged by alternatives that deployed a mode of Hindu exceptionalism that sought to bring to the fore debates such as ‘cow protection’, ‘Shuddhi’, reconversion of non-Hindus. In ‘How I Became a Hindu’ (Goel, 1982), Goel offers his journey as a Gandhian sliding into communism until he firmly entrenched himself in Hinduism or Sanatan Dharma as a panacea for those struggling with choosing Hinduism in India. He offers a critique internal to the right wing of the RSS, arguing that the Sangh influences people using emotive persuasion. However, citing the example of the left and the ‘huge cultural influence’ it has had over policies and governance, Goel argues for a more methodical and rational invoking of  Hinduism as a way of life. He attempts to offer a logical, clinical critique of Islam and Christianity, offering Hinduism, or Sanatan Dharma as he puts it,   as a civilisational ideal and approach on which the nation-state should be established.

Thus growing in a politically charged atmosphere where a rising tide of Hindu nationalist thought was evolving, Swarup and Goel became friends and consequently ideological compradors over time, with their friendship giving birth to an indispensable source of Hindutva thought and ideology. This publication house continues to date, drawing in international voices, cultivating Hindu supremacist thought, bringing in members of the far-right in Europe, and disseminating pieces targeting youth, Voice of India began as a modest expression of Hindu supremacist thought. 

 Creating Voice of India (VOI)

Goel and Swarup continued to engage with various ideologies prior to settling down together with the publication. Swarup was oriented from the very beginning towards the RSS. At the same time, Goel meandered from the Arya Samajis to Gandhism to Communism – of which finally, he recounts, his friend Swarup was able to shake him out of. By 1949, Goel had quit his job in Calcutta, moved to Delhi with Swarup, and joined the RSS journal Organizer. The duo is credited for writing on anti-communism, establishing a think tank, and initiating studies on various Hindu thinkers such as Aurobindo Ghosh and Vivekananda, and even works on Sanskrit theology. But sharing epistemic roots with Indian nationalists did not necessarily mean that the triumvirate shared the same views; they did differ on major issues from Gandhi’s centrism to Nehru’s secular vision or even RSS’s, what they termed, slow pace and alleged quiet obeisance to the Congress government. 

(1921-2003) and his close associate Ram Swarup (1920-92). Notable journalists from the mainstream media, such as Girilal Jain (1924-93), Arun Shourie, S Gurumurthy, and François Gautier, have either directly published works through VOI or have been regarded as respected sympathisers. Additionally, the VOI group has garnered attention from several Western individuals, including Koenraad Elst, a Belgian writer associated with the European New Right, considered the intellectual successor of Goel and Ram Swarup.

Pirbhai (2008) argues that much of the work published by Goel, Swarup and Chatterjee is influenced by the works of German Indology, Vivekananda, and Gandhi’s usage of Brahmanical notions of ‘Self’ and a ‘demonic Other’ that features very much in their writings. Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment critiques of Islam and Muslims also retain influence. This is why the Sangh Parivar politicians used to make use of the VOI publications purely for domestic use, but for global campaigns, the Sangh would refrain from doing, recognising its hardline targets of Christianity as well as Islam, whose adherents are often termed by Goel as ‘Semitic Demons.’ 

Hindutva’s Epistemic Roots

The Indian nation has overseen various people over its short history who have sought to give colour to its origin, credence, and philosophy. Abhas Chatterjee, Sita Ram Goel, and Ram Swarup figure in this particular intellectual history that has endeavoured to define the contours of who is – or can be – an Indian – featuring in a unique trajectory that can be traced back to the Bengal Renaissance itself. (Bhatt, 2001)

Bhatt (2001) argues that while the works of thinkers like Nehru, Tagore, and Chattopadhyay can be said to be vastly different from the works of Goel or Chatterjee, for example, their epistemic foundations certainly remain the same as they end up reproducing the same epistemic resources that right-wing Hindu thinkers utilise. (Bhatt, 2001)  For instance, Nandy outlines that a decolonial India would take from its indigenous folk Hindu traditions and formulate a polity that bases its values and principles on these folk traditions. Chatterjee, Goel, and Swarup, too, argue for a reordering of Indian polity – and society on the basis of Indic traditions. Even in the West, there existed a consistent tradition of turning back to the past to search for newer meanings to attach to newly developing nation-states. The West returned to the Greeks, Romans, and the Judeo-Christian heritage (Anidjar, 2009).

Consequently, it developed a ‘collective ethnology’, and thus when the time came for Indians, several Indians turned to what they understood as India’s indigenous heritage. Thus, Indians incorporated the framework derived from Vedas to provide ideological coherence to bolster their claims for an Indian nation while subscribing to the notion of a glorious Hindu civilisation of the past. While thinkers of the time, from the Bengal Renaissance’s Rammohan Roy to Tagore, did not give us any singular ideology of the Hindu right as it is but they did provide the intellectual grid and structures for right-wing thinkers to later fall back upon and base their arguments and vision on. 

The idea that India was one of the oldest civilisations does not solely belong to Indian nationals; instead, it was European Indologists who first popularised such ideas. Voltaire, Kant, and Schlegel were a few among the various thinkers who propelled this idea. One of them, Heder that is, went so far as to say that Hinduism could be conceived as the birthgiver of humanist thought and values. The acclaimed ‘Father’ of Sociology, Auguste Comte himself, was noted to have said that his ‘Positive sociology’ could provide Brahmins with the means to free themselves of the theocratic influences of Christians and Muslims. (Flora, 1993) Thereby, along with the notion of a supposed glorious Indic past, common amongst all of these narratives by Indians, accompanied a lament that India had faced consistent degeneration due to foreign, colonial influences and invasions. Thus, India needed to be restored to its former glory. 

During British rule, upper-caste Hindus faced political and socio-economic pressures and sought to modernise their thinking in response to European ideas. They borrowed key concepts from Orientalist literature, which portrayed the “Occident” as rational and the “Orient” as mystical. While Orientalists generally favoured Occidental characteristics, Hindu intellectuals reversed the value assigned to Occidental and Oriental traits to validate their indigenous identity. This served their nationalist agenda, which required positioning the British as the ultimate Other. However, after British colonial rule ended in 1947, the significance of this Self-Other dichotomy diminished as India needed to establish relationships with its former coloniser and other Western countries. In the 1970s, with a significant Indian diaspora in Europe and the Americas, intercontinental connections were strengthened, and substantial remittances were sent back to India. These postcolonial shifts influenced the reconfiguration of Hindutva’s Self-Other dichotomies, involving the participation of Indian, Indian diasporic, and European and American thinkers through organisations like Voice of India. Together, they address present realities by constructing a particular interpretation of Hinduism as their “truth

However, the distinction one can draw between Chatterjee, Goel and the rest is that while Indian nationalists, across the spectrum, have determinedly lamented the loss foreign invasions (which includes Muslim and British rulers) have incurred great losses on India, and consequently, are the primary enemies of Hindus – the thinkers focussed on in this essay present an even more incisive addition to the Hindutva pantheon. They have an intense body of work in common aimed at not just discrediting Muslim or Christian history in India but also ensuring that fundamental Christian and Islamic tenets are included in their ideological diatribes. It makes their work markedly distinct from other Indian nationalist writings.  For instance, Sita Ram Goel invoked a ban on the Qur’an in India in his book, published by his publication house Voice of India, Calcutta Quran Petition 1986. The book was subjected to bans, but before it could be banned, it was read widely.  

It can be concluded from his writings that Goel strived to create Hindutva a comprehensive system of thought – which he presumably didn’t think he could complete without drawing, what Pirbhai (2008) calls, a theology of Hindutva. He attempted thus to articulate a singular theological perspective on Hinduism. This theological perspective seemed to answer Hindutva’s critics and supporters who could not see a holistic theos within Hindutva and thus questioned its stature when compared to world religions. According to Koenrad Elst, a German scholar who knew Goel personally, Goel’s work was instrumental in presenting an intellectual body of literature on Hinduism. Goel does exactly that. In one of his texts, he attempts to launch a direct attack at Christian and Islamic theology, asserting that monotheism is akin to materialism. Drawing on modern scholars, classical Hindu texts, and contemporary Indian philosophers, Goel argues with great fervour that monotheistic faiths fail to recognise the divinity in all beings, whether inanimate or animate, living beings. According to him, monotheism reduces everything to the sole purpose of exploitation by man, whereas Hinduism has a differing view; it presents the possibility that man, along with everything in the universe, has a potential for divinity. ‘Paramatma’, when a man achieves divine potential by ‘looking into himself’ and discovering ‘himself’. 

Completing Hindutva: Dawn of a New Paradigm 

The growing popularity of the Sangh Parivar’s political ideology of Hindutva did not progress hand in hand with the articulation of a singular theological perspective on Hinduism. Goel and Swarup, however, sought to counter this perceived drawback by writing a theology and promoting it through Voice of India, with the financial support of the commercial community from which they hailed. If Goel’s political journey echoes that of the Indian centre, his intellectual drive resonates with the motivations of the provincial groups that support Voice of India and the politics of Hindutva. Through the publication, Goel calls for a global ‘pagan’ unity and states that there have been attempts to reconnect with people of several indigenous groups in Australia and the USA. Goel does not provide any further explanation of the mechanics of these meetings. And he fails to account for the fact that several scholars have pointed out that Native Americans in the USA, in particular, cannot be grouped in the category of ‘pagan’. The central preoccupation of the Hindutva movement has consistently been the pursuit of state power and influence. This endeavor to establish control over the powers of the state can be traced through the writings and actions of key figures within the movement. Scholars in the field of social science have noted this underlying objective and its implications for Indian society and governance. Jaffrelot (200) highlights how the RSS and its affiliated organizations have strategically worked to establish a Hindu cultural and political dominance within India. He points out the transformation of Hindutva from a social movement into a political force that actively seeks to shape state policies, thereby illustrating the movement’s inclination towards state power.

The writings of the triumvirate seeking to shape a comprehensive system of Hindutva shed light on the Hindutva movement’s persistent effort to influence and control the state apparatus, thereby indicating its broader objective of reshaping the socio-political landscape of India in accordance with its ideology.  For instance, in his extensive analysis of ethnic and religious conflict in India, Ashutosh Varshney (2002) discusses Hindutva movement’s preoccupation with state power. He elucidates how the movement’s pursuit of political dominance isn’t limited to electoral victories but encompasses a more intricate strategy that seeks to influence state structures, policies, and societal narratives. Varshney’s ethnographic research on Hindutva organisations such as the Shiv Sena in Mumbai shows how the Hindutva movement harnesses communal tensions and religious identities to consolidate political power at the state level.

Varshney’s work resonates with the writings of Abhas Chatterjee, Sita Ram Goel, and Ram Swarupand provide us insight on how a movement endeavors to not only gain political influence but also to redefine the cultural and historical fabric of India. Varshney’s observations illuminate how the movement leverages these narratives to establish a connection with its followers and consolidate its presence within state institutions, contributing to its overarching goal of influencing the exercise of state power. 

Hindu ‘Self’ and the Other

To formulate an understanding of the conception of the Muslim along with the conception of ‘Self’ in these writings, it is pertinent we take to the work of Schmitt’s concept of ‘enemy’ and ‘friend’ which argues that politics revolved around the idea that this fundamental distinction and driving force in politics is the division between one’s own group or collective and an opposing group. For Schmitt, the concept of the political emerges when a group or nation defines its identity in contrast to others and recognises them as a common threat or adversary. He argues that political unity is formed primarily through this recognition. The enemy is seen as a genuine and existential threat to one’s own existence, values, or way of life. This recognition of the enemy creates a sense of cohesion and justifies actions that might otherwise be considered extreme. This distinction between friend and enemy, for Schmitt, transcends beyond disagreement or competition. It is a distinction based on the potential for conflict, confrontation and even violence. 

For Goel, Swarup, and Chatterjee, the Hindu self has seen a fall since the advent of ‘foreign invaders, namely Muslim rulers and the Christian British Empire. Goel argues that the Hindu self is in shambles and suffers from low confidence and a need for ‘imitation’. Goel’s case is that Hinduism, after having ‘given’ into the critique of Western science and Christian and Islamic theology, its followers have sought to remodel itself after Monotheistic faiths. Yet, Goel argues for a reclamation of the self, an assertion that Hinduism’s pluralism, in the sense of divinity, must not be erased. Asserting that polytheism is a natural expression of human consciousness, Goel argues Islam and Christianity are not religions but imperialist ideologies that are political in nature and have survived over the years only by bloodshed. Goel demands an investigation in the ‘asurika’ roots of these religions. Goel seems to be using an oft-used trope of Islam as a ‘barbaric’ force that has been spread, allegedly, by the sword. The enemy is an existential threat. It must be confronted and defeated, if necessary, for the preservation of one’s own identity and interests. Moving further, the ‘Self’, on the other hand, must also be fashioned in somewhat opposition to the ‘enemy’. The depiction of Muslims as demonic is not new. In 1993, Pollock asserted that Muslims had been symbolically portrayed as demons, rakshasa or asuras in many retellings of the Ramayana.  Thus, Muslims have perennially been regarded as demonic in nature to cement their position as the Other as they are perceived as not just a political but epistemic and theological threat to the ‘Self’.  

Indic Pluralism and Intolerant Monotheism

In the works of these new hardliners, the previously observed hypocritical notion of essential unity is countering new ideological challenges. A fresh form of attack against religious minorities in India appears to be emerging in these writings, which openly and unapologetically celebrate the perceived superiority of Hinduism while simultaneously denigrating Islam and Christianity. The argument against these monotheistic faiths is based on their belief in a singular deity, which is seen as inherently intolerant towards polytheistic beliefs. Consequently, the Qur’an is accused of inciting adherents to engage in violent jihad against non-Muslims, while the Bible is criticised for mandating the conversion of non-Christians through proselytisation.

Swarup reinforces the accusations against Muslims, emphasising that their record is filled with the darkest crimes and inhumane acts, which believers themselves find fulfilling but appear as a nightmare to those with normal moral sensibilities. He attributes the persistence of this “inhumanity” to the belief that devout followers of “Semitic” faiths do not need to rely on their own mental faculties or individual judgment. Everything is prescribed for them from birth to death and even beyond. Meanwhile, the extension to “Semites” of traits previously reserved for Islam has added a feature to the discourse: critiques of Christianity by “secular humanists,” ranging from Voltaire and Thomas Paine to Friedrich Nietzsche and Bertrand Russell.  

Firstly, Swarup argues that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have nothing in common with Hindu spiritual traditions. The latter is not based on theology but on the exercise of mental faculties and individual action, which he uses to establish the rationality of Hinduism. Secondly, he claims that followers of these “Semitic” faiths have significantly tried eradicating Hinduism. This dichotomy of “true faith” and “false belief” is rooted in monotheism. At the same time, the “monism” of the “universal religion” (referring to Hinduism) is inherently tolerant and inclusive, as argued by colonial-era Hindus and Orientalists. Assmann (2007) argues that the distinguishing factor in monotheism is not merely the distinction between one God and multiple gods. Instead, he emphasises the differentiation between the true God and the false gods, a concept known as the Mosaic distinction.

Political Theology of Hindutva and Indian Secular Values

The doctrine and principle of secularism have been considered to be a guiding principle to create a mediating language to mitigate the differences between various religions in India; this was a defining argument during the inception of India and remained an instrumental principle to ensure notions of religious tolerance, and coexistence is instructive in conducting relations between the state and religious minorities even as the term ‘Secular’ was added in the preamble in 1976 by the 42nd amendment. (Times of India, 2020) However, this doctrine is criticised as insufficient to many scholars from the entire political spectrum. On modern provisions of statehood, such as these and including democracy and principles of secularism and tolerance, the Hindu right’s stance differs. For Goel, the Hindu society is a civilisational force in itself that has made conditions in India hospital to modern democracy- what is implied is that the forces that could have prevented it are Islam and Christianity. However, a note of supremacism rings through Goel’s writings as does it here.

‘Thus, Hindu society not only presents itself as a prey to these exclusive, intolerant and imperialist ideologies but also acts as a buffer between them. India is secular because India is Hindu. It can be added as a corollary that India is a democracy also because India is Hindu. If Hindu society permits this free-for-all any further, the days of Secularism and Democracy in this country are numbered.’ (Goel, 1999)

Chatterjee further adds, in his book ‘The Concept of Hindu Nation’ (1995), critiquing Nehruvian strains of secularism, arguing that it sought to instil shame and stigma amidst the minds of Hindus and was supportive of Islam, instead of Hindus. Thus, Goel and Chatterjee both seek to undo and critique existing definitions and values that the Indian state has long held since its inception. They both seek to undo and deconstruct what Fuller (2012) calls the state’s mythmaking. 

Fuller et al. (2012), in the book titled ‘The Everyday State and Society in Modern India’, an anthropological exploration of the state, proposes that the state is not any ‘discrete’ entity or organisation. It is difficult to define boundaries of where the state ends and where the society as an object begins. The authors attempt to complicate existing definitions of the state by arguing that while it is taken for granted that the state exists as a neutral arbiter of power and authority, the topic begets further study. For instance, the state itself is a subject of myth and is an ‘ideological project’ in the sense that it is a subject that constructs itself differently with shifts in time. The state-idea, which exists today in Weberian terms as a source of legitimate authority, by right of moral authority over justice and law and state system which exists in practical enactments of state, the authors argue, are in many ways not entirely different but enmeshed together.

Chandra (1990) outlines the evidence of communalism as an ideology, which he outlines comes from ‘religious communalists’, but it does little to highlight what is the nature of communalism, whether each kind of communalism harbour difference beyond their relation to the state, neither is there an examination of the kind of communalism that exists in social relation, which might perhaps be the task of the sociologist here. Chandra further argues that a weak secular state is that which does not take adequate punitive measures against perpetrators of ‘communal violence’, but this further comes from the assumption that the state, even one without constituents who do not belong to a ‘communal’ ideology, plays only the role of the guardian of rights. This assumption exists in what Fuller (ibid.) calls the perpetuation of the state myth as that which is a benevolent Leviathan and further sees any incident of the state participating in violence or denial of justice as a failure of the state or as an exception to the benevolent nature of the modern state. However, this begets crucial questions about how to look at the state that has wholly participated as a partisan actor in incidents of communal violence. This complicates the notion of the modern nation-state.  Fuller (2012) answers this conundrum by saying the state in practice, and the state as the ideal, are both part and parcel of the same entity, and it is difficult to distinguish between the two. 

In an article in Swarajya Magazine, the author congratulates Sitaram Goel for taking the first step towards using state machinery to propagate Hindu ideals. Referring to the Calcutta Quran ban petition by Sitaram Goel, which sought legal help to ban the Qur’an, who defined it as a book condoning violence. However, the state machinery has often been used to take steps and measures that may qualify to be hand in hand with the demands of the Hindu right.

Production of moral indifference

Bauman (1990) asserts the cultural hierarchy prevalent in Germany prior to the second world war structurally put Jews as culturally inferior to the rest of German society. Despite attempts to assimilate, absolute assimilation was never rendered possible. Yet, the question of the Jew was salient in the Third Reich amidst and was a necessary one in the supposed success of the ‘Aryan Race’.

What of the Muslims? Goel is asked. As for the Muslims currently living in India as citizens, Goel does have lengthy responses. He responds with a simple dismissive reference for the minoritarian status of Muslims. He argues that they are citizens but not national or indigenous to India – for only the Hindu is national, and the national is Hindu.

However, the pernicious question of what to do with the remaining population of Muslims in India remains ever present within the Right, even years after the partition. The group remains a suspicious population, ever needing to prove their loyalty to the country. 

Thus, the modern nation has been tasked with articulating previously existing tribes, groups, and religions in the new framework of citizenship and nationhood. Mahmood (Mahmood, 2016) argues that it is the structure of modern nations which sought to demolish pre-modern forms of hierarchy to construct a state where people, recognised as citizens, attain formal equality under law. The subject of the modern nation-state had to swear fealty to the nation, as opposed earlier to the religion, clan, or in the case of India, caste.

And this is where Goel, who incessantly used modern idioms modern civilisational ideas to assert the supremacy of Hindus, brings in the categorisation minority. Muslims and Christians must swear fealty to the nation. And the nation must be Hindu. It is pertinent in this vein to evoke Zygmunt Bauman, whose book Modernity and the Holocaust (1990) is informative and prescient in many ways – one that it can adequately describe the supremacist attitude of the conservative right-wingers in India. Bauman uses the metaphor of the garden to explain the technocratic and bureaucratic vision that stemmed from the Holocaust. He argues that the modern state is a ‘gardening state’ (pp. 28), a state that is intent on weeding out crime, illness and all the elements that serve to hinder its progress.  It is not a coincidence that he uses the metaphor of the garden; the garden as a metaphor for God oft appears in Biblical and Islamic traditions with the logical conclusion of God being the Gardener,  for the salient feature in modernity is the elimination of God as a figure in the aspirations of man.  It is the role of the gardener that is now taken by man, a station earlier believed to be held by God in Christianity, to fashion society into its vision of progress in a manner not so different to the notion of rendering nature subordinate to the whims and will of man, the modern drive that fuelled the scientific revolution.  

Thereby, Goel, Swarup, and Chatterjee each excel in producing one end: moral indifference towards Christians and Muslims. This is similar to how moral indifference was produced towards the Jewish before the Holocaust. Bauman examines how this moral indifference is socially produced – by analysing how bureaucratic measures and policies actively produced social distance between the Jews and others concerning committing violence towards a population through the bureaucratic distance produced by modern governance systems by division of labour. He identifies responsibility, rising from intersubjective relations, as the root structure of morality. This response of duty towards others is what he terms to have a pre-societal origin. It is this response that the Nazi administration successfully thwarted and erased. One method was to instil social distance between Jews and the rest of German society and ‘neutralise the moral urge’ to reach out to them. (pp. 208)  Goel and co. do exactly that. Their task is to gradually produce a reduced sense of empathy towards Muslims and Christians. 

During the Holocaust, this distance was not just produced between citizens but also between those who operated the system. The modern system of rational governance does much to avoid engaging in actual physical violence. For instance, the Final Solution, termed deliberately so, to send Jews to the concentration camp was a matter of signing papers, giving orders, and in the end, carrying them out. Such a step is also presumed a rational, logical criterion behind conducting, as all things in modernity do, according to Bauman. For instance, the initial plan by the Nazis was to transport the Jews to another country, which was initially designated to be Nigeria. Still, it was deemed too impractical  – and finally, a more practical and logical plan was devised, which was termed as the Final Solution, namely genocide, but genocide by remote control. This remotely controlled genocide made it so unique that it offered the officials and operators no proximity to the victims. (pp. 218)  For the likes of Chatterjee, no ‘Final Solution’ of Muslims is derived as of now. All Hindutva writers and thinkers agree that Muslims should live as second-class citizens and should be kept within their ‘limits’ and not have access to any considerable degree of power.

According to Nanda (2002), there is a growing emergence of a new ‘triumphalist’ mindset that boldly and unapologetically celebrates what is claimed to be the superiority of Hinduism while criticising the perceived shortcomings of Islam and, to a lesser degree, Christianity. This viewpoint is rooted in the argument that Islam and Christianity, being monotheistic religions, are inherently intolerant towards those who adhere to polytheistic beliefs. Consequently, the Quran is accused of promoting the incitement of the faithful to engage in violent jihad against non-Muslims. At the same time, the Bible is condemned for commanding believers to actively proselytise and convert non-Christians.

The nation has gained significant attention from the rest of the world due to its impact on the global economy. As a result, there is a growing desire and aspiration amongst the masses to shake off the tag of an impoverished country and to be recognised as a powerful nation, and Hindu hardliners offer religious justifications for this aspiration. Arendt (1951) identified how Nazi propaganda played a crucial role in manipulating and controlling the masses by exploiting their fears, prejudices, desires, and this case – aspirations. She highlights how propaganda, in the context of totalitarian regimes, is not simply a means of persuasion or information dissemination but a powerful tool for mobilising and shaping public opinion.

According to Arendt (1951), Nazi propaganda sought to create a fictional narrative and alternative reality that resonated with the grievances and frustrations of the German population. The Nazis skillfully employed emotional appeals, symbolism, repetition, and the distortion of facts to create a sense of unity, rally support, and fuel anti-Semitic sentiments. The propagation of lies and the manufacturing of enemies helped solidify the regime’s power and foster a climate of obedience and conformity. This is exactly what VOI intends to do despite claims to take a ‘rational’ approach and disseminate Indic theory to the masses – it caters to the same Islamophobic sentiments and emotive responses that it decries in the beginning of its vision. 

Yet, what marks it crucial to understand the works of these writers is that it provides seemingly liberal justifications for criticising Islam and Christianity, as well as their followers. While the former leader M S Golwalkar, who admired Hitler, endorsed ideas like “race spirit,” the new group of hardliners present their arguments regarding liberal ideals such as pluralism, tolerance, and scientific progress, which they claim are abundant in Hinduism since time immemorial. Consequently, the spirit of hatred that Golwalkar embodied continues to exist. But it is now expressed by asserting the superiority of Hindu dharma instead of borrowing a linguistic style from German or Italian fascism. Regrettably, these developments have not received much attention from scholars.

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